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両面性市場におけるベルトラン競争:ネットワーク効果はいつプラットフォーム間格差を広げるか
https://toyoeiwa.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/1657
https://toyoeiwa.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/165773a138c0-b632-4b78-99ea-331182ae6288
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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TEDK-N18_P1-10 (911.0 kB)
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Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2022-03-22 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | 両面性市場におけるベルトラン競争:ネットワーク効果はいつプラットフォーム間格差を広げるか | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
タイトル | Two-sided Market and Bertrand Competition: When Do Indirect Network Effects Widen the Platformers’Gap? | |||||
言語 | en | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | jpn | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | 両面性市場 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | 間接ネットワーク効果 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | プラットフォーム | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | 直接ネットワーク効果 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | ベルトラン競争 | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Two-sided market | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Indirect Network Effect | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Direct Network Effect | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Platform | |||||
キーワード | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||
主題 | Bertrand Competition | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
著者 |
長谷川, かおり
× 長谷川, かおり |
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抄録 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
内容記述 | In a two-sided market, there are product or services makers who want to reach potential customers and consumers that search providers of products or services via platforms. For example, Google has its search engine, and users are potential customers for their advertisement services. In two-sided markets the platform providers have a pair of markets that are linked by inter-market externality. If the members of one of the two-sided markets are better off by the increase of the size of the other market, the second market has positive indirect network effect on the first. This inter-market externality enables the profit subsidy from the first to the second. This asymmetric character of the two-sided market is called“the Seesaw Principle”that has been studied in the scholarly literature by comparative statistics of two-sided markets. In the scholarly literature, it is well known that platformers maximize the sum of each market and that it causes the inefficiency of the price mechanism for each market. However, since most of the studies fix the number of platforms exogenously, the impact of the network effect on the market size is unclear. In this paper, the problem is formulated as a Bertrand–Nash oligopolistic competition. In contrast to what has been suggested by the existing scholarly literature, we have demonstrated that in our setting, the indirect network effect can result in monopoly nor competitiveness. Also, we have shown analytically how network effects widen the gap among platforms. | |||||
書誌情報 |
東洋英和大学院紀要 en : The journal of the Graduate School of Toyo Eiwa University 巻 18, p. 1-10, 発行日 2022-03-15 |
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出版者 | ||||||
出版者 | 東洋英和女学院大学大学院 | |||||
ISSN | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||
収録物識別子 | 13497715 | |||||
書誌レコードID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AA12040336 | |||||
著者版フラグ | ||||||
出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |